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To cite this article: Vanessa Watson (2014) Co-production and collaboration in planning – The difference, Planning Theory & Practice, 15:1, 62-76, DOI: 10.1080/14649357.2013.866266

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2013.866266

Published online: 30 Jan 2014.
Co-production and collaboration in planning – The difference
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(Received 5 January 2013; accepted 12 November 2013)

Processes of state-society engagement around urban development issues, termed co-production, have been documented in both the Public Administration and Development Studies fields, but until recently have not attracted much attention in planning. Yet, particularly more recent approaches and cases of co-production from global South contexts do offer the possibility of adding to planning debates in this area, by expanding the context which shapes planning ideas beyond the global North, and perhaps shifting planning theory in the direction of becoming truly international. The paper identifies the important differences which underlie various strands of thinking about co-production, and also between these and planning assumptions in the area of collaborative and communicative planning.

Keywords: co-production; state-society engagement; communicative and collaborative planning; global South; Shack/Slum Dwellers International; Asian Coalition for Housing Rights

Introduction
How state and society engage on issues related to urban planning has been a prominent theme in planning literature for at least the last two decades (see Hillier & Healey, 2008). There has been no one identifiable position or theory emerging from debates on this question – rather a set of differing ideas and positions informed by different (although primarily global North) contexts and drawing on a range of different intellectual traditions. Early terminology in these debates referred to “collaborative” and “communicative” planning (with Patsy Healey and Judith Innes, along with a number of other scholars, closely associated with these terms), while later critiques introduced concepts such as “agonism” (Jean Hillier), drew on Foucaultian ideas of power (Bent Flyvbjerg), and bemoaned the pre-occupation with decision-making processes at the expense of spatial processes and outcomes (Margo Huxley and Oren Yiftachel). It is not the purpose of this paper to track the rich history of these debates, rather it focuses on one area of concern (Watson, 2002, 2009): that much of the analytical and normative thinking on the subject of state–society engagement in planning has been informed (often implicitly) by the particular social conditions in global North regions of the world characterized by Western liberal democracy and mature advanced economies (to varying degrees). When such analytical and normative ideas of planning have spread from their regions of origin to other very different parts of the world (as they inevitably do) then these underlying informants no longer hold, or only hold partially, throwing into question the usefulness of these ideas for planning theorists and practitioners alike.

In addition, reaching the global demographic “tipping point” of over 50% of the world’s population in cities, an increasing proportion of which will be in cities of the global South (UN Habitat, 2009), has in various ways focused attention on the need for planning ideas more attuned to those parts of the world where urban areas feel the pressures of rapid urbanization under conditions of poverty, unemployment, poor infrastructure, unstable political conditions and weak

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public institutions. There is a firm recognition of the need for urban planning in these parts of the world, but also recognition that approaches to planning commonly in use are often outdated or were developed with very different socio-spatial conditions in mind. The proposition that planning should take a “view from the South” (Watson, 2009) suggests that a deeper awareness of the complexities of these contexts can unsettle taken-for-granted assumptions which underlie planning theory of Northern origins, and invigorate planning theory debates by drawing attention to new circumstances and challenges to which planning needs to respond.

Brownill and Parker (2010) have suggested that planning debates on state-society engagement are now in a “post-collaborative” phase, with attention shifting to the difficulties of these processes as well as to the range of contexts and conditions within which participation takes place (also see Healey, 2012). This broadening of interest and contexts has manifested itself in a somewhat overdue recognition in planning of the debates on participation in global South situations which have long pre-occupied the field of development studies (see Beall & Fox, 2009); in interest in citizen action in global South cities (for example, drawing on James Holston’s work on insurgency in Brazil, see Meth, 2010; Miraftab, 2009); in Brazil’s participatory budgeting initiatives (Abers, 1998) and in using the concept of informality to explain state decision-making processes in planning (Roy, 2009a; Yiftachel, 2009).

This exploration of alternative forms of state-society engagement in planning is situated within a broader concern about the functioning of liberal democratic states in many parts of the world in which, as Fung and Wright (2003, p. 3) have argued, formal systems of democracy seem increasingly ineffective in accomplishing the ideals of democratic politics. But rather than weakly accept that the era of the “affirmative democratic state” is over, they suggest the focus should rather turn to what might be the core of the problem: the specific design of institutions which can deliver transformative democratic strategies. This aim, they argue, calls for the development of mechanisms of “empowered participatory governance” which rely on the commitment and capacities of ordinary people and tie action to discussion.

The purpose of this paper is to explore another set of discussions of forms of state–society engagement which are structuring planning and urban development processes in certain global South contexts: that of co-production. There are a number of reasons why the idea of co-production should be of interest to planning theory. Firstly, co-production represents one way in which poor urban communities have been able to secure significant improvements to their living environments under conditions in which governments are either unwilling or unable to deliver land and services. Recent cases of co-production indicate a quite different form of “participation” to examples commonly represented as collaborative or communicative planning. Co-production cases therefore serve to “deepen the pot” from which planning ideas can be drawn and hence potentially expand the scope of planning thought. Secondly, and following on from the previous point, paying attention to forms of engagement on planning issues in very different contexts, including global South cases of co-production, can foster an internationalization of planning theory and, as Seekings and Keil (2009) have argued for urban theory, can underscore the argument that the experiences of Europe and America may not be universally applicable and are far more likely to be exceptional from a global perspective. Thirdly, planning theory can influence practice even if indirectly and unevenly. Where cases of co-production can illustrate innovative and potentially positive processes of state–society engagement under difficult conditions, then it is important to extract both the successes and pitfalls of these cases and feed them back into the realm of planning practice. Fourthly, the concept of co-production itself is unclear and the term has been applied to a range of different forms of state–society engagement on urban development issues. The various interpretations of the term co-production do have elements in common, yet in other ways they are profoundly different. As the term begins to find its way into planning theory (Albrechts, 2013) it is important to clarify the different meanings of the term and how these interpretations might or
might not differ from thinking about the kind of state–society engagements which have occupied planning theory for the last several decades: collaborative and communicative planning.

This paper is based on a literature review of cases and discussions of co-production, rather than on own empirical research. It is fortunate that there are a good number of published cases of co-production spanning some decades, although generally these have not made an appearance in planning journals and are rather to be found in the public administration (earlier cases) and development studies fields (later cases). This split between disciplinary areas also manifests itself in a difference in interpretation of the concept, leading to some of the potential confusions referred to above.

The paper begins with a review of the literature on co-production, starting with the earlier work of Elinor Ostrom and the subsequent development of her ideas, mainly in public administration journals. I have termed these state-initiated concepts of co-production, given the role of the state which underpins most of these writings and practices. More recent cases of co-production, more often found in development and urban studies journals, are primarily linked to the work of two international non-governmental organizations (NGOs): Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) and the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR). I have described these as cases of social movement-initiated co-production, given the nature of the actors which tend to take the initiative in such processes. Once initiated, of course, these processes can vary significantly in terms of how power operates in and through such relationships. This section of the paper goes into some detail on the tactics and strategies adopted by communities engaged in co-production processes.

The following section of the paper moves to clarify the commonalities and differences between state–society engagement as approached through variants of co-production and as understood in much of the planning literature on participation. Given the main purpose of this paper, to broaden the range of concepts, ideas and contexts which feed debates on planning processes, it is important to stress just how different these co-production processes can be, and how their starting assumptions reflect the very different contexts in which they are taking place. The last section of the paper asks how meaningful the concept of co-production might be for planning thought, and the extent to which co-production cases challenge assumptions taken for granted in the field and expand the scope of debates on state–society engagement in planning.

**Earlier, state-initiated interpretations of co-production**

The term co-production has its roots in the work of political economist Elinor Ostrom (who in turn was building on ideas about co-production in the Public Administration field in the US and UK originating in the 1970s). She defined co-production as “a process through which inputs from individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization are transformed into goods and services” (Ostrom, 1996, p. 1073). The focus in this literature is on the provision of public services (e.g. sanitation systems, schools) where involvement of the state with communities can create synergies through parties contributing in different but complementary ways: communities (she suggests) have local information, time, skills, for example, and the state has resources and technical expertise. Moreover, state and society have different production capacities: for example, states can produce trunk services while citizens can produce related feeder services. The suggestion here is that state and citizens (service beneficiaries) have different but complementary forms of knowledge which together can improve the final outcome. Where citizens can substitute for the state in service provision then it is simply a case of working out which can operate most cost-effectively at a given scale.

Ostrom’s work has strong links to social capital thinking and theories of urban governance and service delivery in the USA from the late 1970s, where her position was one of encouraging decentralization to bring government closer to citizens. Co-production, she argued, fosters social capital as communities organize around service provision and management. There is no direct
mention of mediating social movements or NGOs: the relationship is a direct one between communities and officials. There are important assumptions underpinning this work that were at the same time being explored in the parallel “public participation in development” literature in the development studies field (Beall & Fox, 2009). These assumptions (in both Ostrom’s and participation debates) were that all community members and households would gain equal access to these services, that exclusion on the grounds of income, gender, ethnicity, for example, would not play a role, and that the relationship between state and citizens would be fair, consensual, and not corrupt or politicized. In other words, power was not theorized in Ostrom’s co-production; and if serious conflicts emerged then it was assumed that they could be contained.

Since Ostrom’s 1996 article there has been further work on the role co-production can play in service delivery. Joshi and Moore (2004) introduced the term “institutionalized co-production” to refer to hybrid forms of state–society engagement in service provision, but the implication is that this is only really required in the context of weak states, where governments are unable to provide services or lack information about need variation; or where governments seek to cut costs of service delivery. They suggest that co-production can be useful where there is the need (by the state) to mobilize resources to face logistical challenges, but there is little sense that community building is a key goal here, that co-production should extend beyond the delivery of services, or that changing the nature of the state and governance might be a significant outcome. Brandsen and Pestoff (2006), writing in a public administration journal, point to a difference between co-governance (planning and delivery), co-management (joint production) and co-production (citizen production). But co-production is defined as voluntary efforts by individual citizens, placing it largely within the realm of charity and “third sector” work.

In a further extension of this strand of co-production thinking, Bovaird’s (2007) conception is based on “third sector” cases from the UK and USA (with the notable exception of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre). He views co-production as having many positive benefits, but these are still framed within a concern for efficient and cost-effective state service delivery rather than community empowerment as an end in itself. Listing what he sees as the limitations of co-production, he notes that it almost always means a redistribution of power amongst stakeholders and that the process is necessarily highly political. The most significant limitation for him is that it dilutes public accountability and “blurs the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors” (Bovaird, 2007, p. 856). Hence, he argues, the outcomes of co-production can be socially undesirable and there is a need for “reserve powers of state regulation” (p. 857). Bovaird (2007) is concerned that community-based co-production can therefore violate the principles of the Weberian state, although this may be less of a concern in other parts of the world where “the Weberian state is a far away ideal or had never taken off, and is now challenged by other conceptions of the state” (Bénit-Gbaffou & Oldfield, 2011, p. 446).

Mitlin (2008, p. 347), who has argued for a different interpretation of co-production, points out that none of these authors locate co-production within a broader struggle for choice, self-determination and meso-level political relations in which citizens both seek an engagement with the state (to secure redistribution, reduce free riders, for example) and are also oriented towards self-management and local control over local provision in areas related to basic needs.

In these cases and interpretations (above) the state is generally the instigator of the relationship and the balance of power remains firmly with the state.

**Social movement initiated co-production**

More recently (Mitlin, 2008), the term co-production has been applied to particular forms of state–society engagement taking place primarily in cities in the global South. Within these
engagements a source of power which counters that of the state is frequently provided by “social
movements”, defined by Bebbington, Mitlin, Mogaladi, Scurrah, and Bielich (2010, p. 1306) as:

> a process of mobilisation that is sustained across time and space, rather than as a specific organization.

[They] … include the more nebulous, uncoordinated, and cyclical forms of collective action, popular protest and networks that serve to link organised and dispersed actors in processes of social mobilisation … [and can be] … several networks and organisations aiming to change elements of the political, economic and social system.

They may form around issues of collective consumption (housing and services), labour and employment issues or issues of identity and recognition, but in all cases, these authors argue, movements seek to change the way in which institutions of the state govern. This, they add (p. 1308), often goes beyond attempts to influence policy and rather engages the state at a more fundamental level, sometimes using strategies of co-production (p. 1309) and sometimes tactics of protest action.

NGOs are frequently part of such social movements, giving professional support to organizations they encourage. NGOs able to upscale these “good practices” through global networks have attracted particular attention and support: SDI has been prominent here, although it is not the only example of such networking. Appadurai (2001) has suggested that these local groupings and movements, as they link up through transnational advocacy networks, are instruments of “deep democracy”, and are redefining concepts of governance. Emerging issue-based global networks, Appadurai argues, present a post-Marxist and post-developmentalist vision of new forms of democracy, networks being a mechanism through which the poor show that they are better able to provide for basic needs than “the usual candidates” – the market, the state and global development agencies (Appadurai, 2001, p. 41). Other writers have questioned this optimistic view of co-production practices (this debate will be explored further below). Understanding these political dynamics and the debates surrounding them helps to explain the differences between the various strands of co-production, and between co-production and participatory processes in other parts of the world.

In a 2008 article Diana Mitlin interprets the work of the global NGO federation known as SDI, as “bottom-up co-production”. She explains this form of co-production as a political strategy used by citizen groups and social movement organizations to “enable individual members and their associations to secure effective relations with state institutions that address both immediate basic needs and enable them to negotiate for greater benefits” (Mitlin, 2008, p. 339). The SDI approach to co-production, she argues, is increasingly being used by the urban poor as a way of politically consolidating their base and extracting gains from the state. Acknowledging that accessing services is often reliant on large scale, urban capital investments (e.g. in waste-water treatment systems) which can only be undertaken by the state, poor communities choose to engage with local government on these issues. Mitlin (2008) argues that SDI’s co-production is different from standard “participation” or “partnership” arrangements. It is also more effective than “lobbying” or “protesting” in terms of actually gaining benefits, and the predominantly non-confrontational nature of the process used by SDI allows greater participation from women and better chances of securing political gains.

SDI, established in 1996, is a global network of community-based organizations of the urban poor with its origins in India, but now with a presence in 33 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (www.sdi.org). It is made up of regional or national federations of urban poor movements and the NGOs that support them. SDI assists community-based organizations and their federations to engage with governments and national and international organizations around urban strategies which address urban land, shelter and service needs, and shift urban policy towards a more pro-poor stance. Another similar and linked “sister” network is the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR)¹ which is currently completing a three-year housing upgrade programme with communities in 19 Asian countries. Similar to SDI, its base is in grassroots organizations and their supporting NGOs within cities, but they also aim to elevate their activities to the city-wide scale and
make community-upgrading a central part of city politics. In this respect both networks have their base in grassroots organizations operating at the level of settlements (hence at a similar scale to the examples of co-production described in the previous section), but through a process of federating, and then linking to international NGOs such as SDI and ACHR, these local organizations gain access to much wider networks and support.

SDI promotes a particular set and sequence of grass-roots practices (which they now term “rituals”) which were first tried in the context of urban India, and have since been internationalized through the global work of the NGO. SDI argues the value of collaborative relationships with government, but in practice these relationships can take on a combination of both conflict and collaboration, depending on the issues and strategies at hand, in order to achieve institutional change (Bradlow, 2013). ACHR has adopted a set of practices very similar to those of SDI, and these include settlement self-enumeration and mapping, learning exchanges, community-based savings schemes and building relationships with city governments. These practices are explained more fully below as they help to define the nature of this form of co-production.

**Self-enumeration and mapping**

The first of these “rituals” is a process of self-enumeration and settlement mapping of poor (usually informal) communities, carried out by households themselves. Various levels and forms of data capture are used (see Patel, Baptist, & D’Cruz, 2012), depending on the issue at hand, and the results are used to engage with government. In some situations the data is used to resist threatened evictions and relocations, in other cases it is used to negotiate with government for tenure and services. The self-enumeration tactic was originally developed amongst pavement dwellers in India to support their claims for recognition, but is now regularly used to reinforce and specify demands by poor communities, and to increase their “visibility” to the state. The scaling up of SDI and ACHR to become international networks has spread these tactics from their origin in India to informal settlements in other parts of the world. In what could be described as a growing global self-survey “movement” amongst poor urban communities, these traditional tools of planning and governance – the survey, the map and the plan – have been appropriated and used as a mechanism to further the claims of marginalized groups to urban space.

Chatterji and Mehta (2007), in theorizing the self-enumeration movement, have argued that the articulation of power and knowledge in practices of government manifests in technologies of mapping and enumeration by which the state makes society visible to itself, and these can end up creating new types of social collectivities. Populations generated by these governmental practices, which mark and categorize them in particular ways (as “slum dwellers” or “pavement dwellers”) can end up seeing themselves as communities capable of resisting these technologies (Chatterji and Mehta, 2007, p. 131). As a result, slum dwellers have used the survey like government does, to transform themselves into a quantifiable population, and to create documentary proof that they exist as a collective that can speak back to government in its own language (p. 143). In India NGOs have used the surveys specifically for mobilization and to make slum dwellers aware of a new identity based on abstract citizenship rather than on caste or religion (p. 159). Appadurai (2001) calls this creating “governmentality from below”.

Importantly, enumeration and mapping processes are not just about producing data, however important this might be. Appadurai (2012, p. 640) calls these processes “tools for group formation”, in the sense that they allow the creation of an “abstraction” that can have social and moral significance in the minds of community members. They are also seen to encourage a common understanding and dialogue between community members which helps form a political basis for engagement with government (Patel et al., 2012). As such they may not be once off activities, but can be ongoing and repeated processes.
**Engaging government on planning and upgrading**

In a number of federations of community organizations linked to SDI and to ACHR the enumeration and mapping processes have then proceeded to settlement upgrade and construction. In the case of ACHR, a major three-year programme termed the Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCR) has focused on linking informal settlement upgrade projects within a city into city-wide strategies (see Archer, Luansang, & Boonmahathanakorn, 2012). In some instances joint city development committees have been formed in partnership with local government, and new financial mechanisms (City Development Funds) have been set up for joint funding of projects. Here a planning process has been developed (see Archer et al., 2012, p. 124,) in which a relatively conventional sequence of steps starting with analysis, moving to visioning and participation around alternatives and then to construction and management, all carried out by the community, is paralleled with a social and political process involving savings groups, networks, negotiating with government, drawing on universities for technical assistance, and establishing local committees. The role of government here has been in granting land and tenure rights and providing larger elements of infrastructure (Archer, 2012). Some SDI-linked communities and affiliated NGOs have also secured government support to undertake self-enumeration and mapping. In an informal settlement in Harare, Zimbabwe, the local planning authority sanctioned the enumeration process and actually participated in data gathering and in an SDI-organized “learning exchange” with other countries. Local politicians appear to have engaged in community building in support of this process (Chitekwe-Biti, Mudimu, Nyama, & Jera, 2012). In a further case (Mitlin, 2008) the Windhoek city government assisted the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia with land and communal services.

Exactly why local governments in some cities are prepared to support and work with communities in co-production processes, and in other cases are not, will depend on a wide range of contextual factors. Bebbington et al. (2010, p. 1320) suggest that these dynamics are reflective of “histories of state–society interaction, of perceptions of the state, development and political parties, and of the formation of individuals who subsequently emerge as leaders, influenced by the culture that their own histories lead them to carry with them.” Dynamics can also reflect anticipated events such as up-coming elections, and hence these partnerships can be volatile and unpredictable.

**Other “rituals”: savings schemes, learning exchanges and exhibitions**

Small-scale savings schemes are of central importance to the organizations and (following Appadurai, 2001) have ideological status: they are an entry point for relationship building between individuals and groups, they express a moral discipline in the organizations and a commitment to the public good, and they highlight the role of women as prime savers. A further ritual is “precedent setting”, a term used to describe the collective building of shack and toilet models (often in central public places and events) but, argues Appadurai (2001, p. 34), at the same time the attachment of the legal term “precedent” to such models “moves the poor into the horizon of legality on their own terms.” There are thus tactics of language but also of material and organizational action, in particular self-surveys and enumerations, toilet festivals and housing exhibitions.

Similarly SDI’s toilet festivals and housing (shack) exhibitions have political purpose: to demonstrate that the poor have the knowledge and expertise to construct their own housing and facilities, and that the standard flow of expert knowledge can be reversed (Appadurai, 2001). In fact these learning strategies between communities have been a central feature of their work. “Horizontal exchanges” involve groups of poor moving between sites to share knowledge and gains in savings, construction and engagement with authorities. They help to indicate to those in authority that the poor also travel and have wider linkages, giving an element of authority and legitimation. McFarlane (2011, p. 69) refers to these exchanges as “translocal urban learning assemblages” of materials, practices,
designs, knowledge, personal stories and local histories, with the notion of assemblage placing an emphasis on urban learning and alignment between the social and material at different sites.

The role of built environment professionals and planners

Both SDI and ACHR indicate a clear role for professionals, which is far closer to that of providing community support than of being the professional technical expert. A documented case (Livengood & Kunte, 2012) of community enumeration and mapping in Cuttack (India) explains how technologies such as GIS and remote sensing used by government excluded community participation as residents found the results difficult to understand and challenge. However, when technical professionals were persuaded to use techniques such as hand-held Global Positioning Devices (GPS) and work with residents directly on the site, then maps were produced which settlement residents could understand and believe. In its processes, SDI has also made use of architects and planners, either located within the NGO or in universities, but their involvement has been based on their need to recognize that the poor know best about how to survive in poverty. Archer et al. (2012, p. 127), in discussing the role of the “community architect” in ACHR projects, suggest that they should “provide the right guidance without controlling all the processes”, should “ask the right questions” rather than provide all the answers, should assist the community in “finding answers for themselves”, and should be able to bring together physical and social aspects of the process. They need to play a teaching role, as in training communities to read maps and satellite pictures, and to understand the financial aspects of upgrade. Their goal should be to set up a process that is “sustainable without their intervention”. SDI also places value in drawing students in to enhance their learning (as well as sending “community professors” to give lectures to students). This strategy has been formalized in sub-Saharan Africa through a memorandum of understanding between SDI and the Association of African Planning Schools (Watson & Odendaal, 2013) which provides for joint studios between planning students and SDI affiliate organizations.

In the introduction to this article it was suggested that these social movement-initiated forms of co-production present a significantly different form of state–society engagement on urban planning issues to those more commonly discussed in planning as collaborative or communicative planning. The next section of this paper argues that there are some elements in common but also some significant differences.

Co-production and planning engagement: commonalities and differences

Commonalities

In some respects the various approaches to co-production (above) and ideas of collaborative and communicative planning have elements in common. Firstly, all these positions have been concerned with how state and society can engage in order to improve the quality of life of populations, sometimes with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized, and sometimes with these outcomes specified as socio-spatial justice and more equitable and sustainable outcomes of state intervention in urban development, and how professionals can act to promote this. Certainly, underlying goals and values have much in common. Secondly, variants of co-production, and collaborative and communicative planning approaches would find common ground in that none takes a radical approach to social change. All take an incremental, evolutionary and social learning approach to shifting actions of the state in particular directions and securing gains for particular groups or places. SDI takes this approach as it argues that there are certain roles and functions (such as trunk infrastructure) that the state can carry out and communities cannot, and that confrontation strategies (particularly protests and violence) tend to exclude women. SDI also argues that securing service delivery through protest alone can be counter-productive as the product is unlikely to be appropriate to need unless the poor have been directly involved in shaping
outcomes. The strategy of patience and slow gains is an accepted part of both SDI and ACHR work, although this has often attracted criticism both from communities and other NGOs wanting quicker wins. Building and sharing local knowledge and resources (through micro-savings) to create community self-reliance is also a central part of both NGO strategies, given the starting assumption that the poor know best how to live in poverty. While it is true that SDI can adopt a mixture of strategies involving both protest action and collaboration with government (Bradlow, 2013) where it appears necessary to put pressure on politicians and officials to act, the collaborative element remains an important part of any project.

Thirdly, variants of co-production, along with collaborative and communicative planning positions, assume a context of democracy, where “active citizens” are able and prepared to engage collectively and individually (with each other and with the state) to improve their material and political conditions. Appadurai (2001) has gone further to suggest that SDI’s co-production is a way of deepening democracy, although he also calls for new models of global governance and local democracy, and his concept of “democracy from below” certainly departs from accepted forms of Western liberal democracy. But while democracy in itself is a common assumption underlying these positions on engagement, it does need to be recognized that the nature and form of democracy varies widely across the world, and that in many regions everyday political practices can depart significantly from what are accepted norms and practices in many Western liberal democracies.

Robins, Cornwall, and Von Lieres (2008, p. 1072) suggest that everyday political practices are often very different from those anticipated by NGOs, international agencies or governments and professionals, hence “civil society organisations do not automatically possess the democratising properties associated with the public sphere under liberal democracies.” Robins et al. (2008) point to ways in which power and patronage routinely infuse participation processes in development projects. Donor- or agency-driven community empowerment programmes frequently run up against entrenched political cultures of patronage and paternalism which are commonplace in everyday political life in many parts of the global South. They suggest that there is a logic to such practices: they are essential components of strategies of survival, creating conditions of access to vital resources and cannot be wished away by introducing political models from elsewhere. Hence, poor communities will often shift between clientelism and rights-based citizenship claims, using apparently contradictory discourses opportunistically (a strategy of “tactical bricolage”). It is important, therefore, not to confuse the emergence of organizations “giving voice” and the actual processes in which marginalized groups engage in order to secure political and material gains. Such relationships go against the grain of both collaborative planning and co-production, yet they cannot be either wished away or policed in situations where societal ethics have been stretched to accommodate such practices as acceptable.

NGO work in this field, has also been viewed with some caution, involving practices that stretch the definition of democracy. Roy (2009b) uses the term “civic governmentality” to describe the strategies of SDI-linked SPARC in Mumbai as well as Hezbollah in Beirut. She sees these organizations, not as a zone of contact or mediation between state and community, but as engaged in the process of constructing and managing a “civic realm” while both resisting and complying with top-down rule. This involves a “civilizing” of political society (p. 161), fostering civic identity and broader civic commitment. But Roy (2009b) provocatively asks if SPARC and Hezbollah can also be seen as agents in/of urban redevelopment (p. 168) in that their engagement with land redevelopment inevitably leads to new processes of inclusion and exclusion of the poor.

**Differences**

While participatory planning approaches and variants of co-production do have elements in common (with a degree of qualification), in a number of other respects they are significantly different.
Firstly, co-production, particularly when initiated by social movements, almost inevitably works outside (and sometimes against) established rules and procedures of governance in terms of engagement with the state, while this is much less usual (although not impossible) in collaborative and communicative planning processes. Co-production processes have often come into being precisely because formal channels of engagement do not exist or are not satisfactory, and other ways to engage have to be found. In many parts of the global South, planning and urban development laws and regulations are inherited from colonial times and channels for engagement at best may allow for no more than formal presentations of state plans to communities.

Secondly, collaborative and communicative planning processes have generally focused on the debates needed to shape plans but have been less concerned with involvement in delivery processes and subsequent management of projects, although the suggestion that planning processes should consider this has certainly been raised. Thus McGuirk (2001) has noted that planners have been strongly concerned with communicative rationality but far less concerned with instrumental rationality involving the conversion of agreed ideas to plans and regulations, and hence to implementation. In co-production, however, Bovaird (2007) points out the value of involving users of services and communities in all stages of the delivery process including implementation (which can mean physical construction and actual service delivery), and in cases of bottom-up co-production, community control over all stages from initiation of intervention, to data collection and analysis, to planning, implementation and management, as an essential part of their approach. The role of the state is assumed to be limited to those aspects that cannot be dealt with by communities: acquisition of land and tenure, elements of bulk infrastructure and some co-funding.

However, while all co-production approaches want to push state–society engagement through both planning and delivery stages, co-production initiatives by affiliates of SDI and ANCR are far less concerned with achieving only cost-efficient projects (Appadurai, 2001) and effective local government (although these may be important preconditions) and far more with skilling and empowering marginalized communities to manage their own living environments, to deal effectively with state structures, to structurally advance citizen control over state resources and political power, and to pass on tactics for achieving this to other communities through global networks. Different as well is the way in which SDI affiliates regard their relationship with the state, described by Mitlin (2008) as a partnership, but a highly political one. The immediate goal may be to secure outcomes in terms of service and land delivery, but such initiatives also aim to shift forms of democratic practice and power, to create an alternative form of governmentality – Roy’s (2009b) “civic realm” which both complies with and resists top down rule, and Appadurai’s (2001) “counter-governmentality”. Understanding the role of knowledge and power is central to these processes, and hence the need to exercise power through self-enumerations and mapping and to control the production and interpretation of this critical information.

Thirdly, bottom-up co-production takes a different position on power and conflict from certain positions in collaborative and communicative planning. The latter have long been criticized (see Huxley, 2000, for an early critique) for understandings of power in deliberative planning processes, and assumptions that its destructive effects can be overcome through debate. Ostrom’s writings on co-production, as well as related writings largely from the public administration field, acknowledge the issues of conflict and power struggles between parties involved in co-production processes, but neither seem to be central issues in these writings and in a sense are again assumed away. Power and conflict have not been thoroughly theorized in relation to co-production initiated by social movements either, but there is an awareness (drawing on Foucault) that power is embodied in development processes and in technologies of rule such as surveys and maps (Chatterji & Mehta, 2007), and these must be appropriated by communities. Mitlin (2008, p. 357) argues that challenging the state as a community resists state control through individualization and allows different modes of governmentality to be
considered. The issue of power and conflict within community organizations (which is unlikely
to be absent) and in relation to different forms of engagement with the state (Robins et al., 2008)
still needs consideration.

Fourthly, in SDI and ACHR work, there is less reliance on talk and debate and more on showing
and learning by doing (McFarlane, 2011). Engagement with the state and other agencies thus has
strong material and tangible expressions. Community-built demonstration models — of houses
or toilets — are an important element of SDI and ACHR “rituals” to physically demonstrate outcomes
to the state and other communities which may be learning from the process. Similarly, the acquisition
of knowledge by communities is not from texts or consultants, but from learning exchanges with
communities in similar circumstances to see first-hand what they have built. The philosophy here is
one of experiential learning: that direct experience is the most effective way to gain knowledge.

Fifthly, central to SDI and ACHR work is the intention to up-scale local practices through
global networks (Appadurai, 2001, p. 42), which is not a feature either of the state-initiated
approaches to co-production or collaborative and communicative planning. The networks of SDI
now span three continents, with a focus on India and Africa, and ACHR has links in large parts of
Asia. Learning exchanges between local affiliates focus on local experiences but then these are
distributed rapidly through the network. Being networked globally gives local organizations
authority to respond to and pronounce on global issues, to be rapidly informed on local issues across
a wide range of contexts, and they also give status to organizational statements and claims, and
presence at global events. Their power lies in their information base, their ideas and their flexibility.
Further, collective global learning experiences (a global “portfolio” of experiences and successes)
can be mobilized by local affiliates giving them significant additional clout when negotiating with
their own local or even national governments. McFarlane (2009) has described SDI as a “translocal
assemblage” in that it is concerned with both the local practices and the international network.
Activities of the SDI and ACHR member groups are place-based: they are concerned with tactics
and strategies of various kinds, some symbolic, in specific local contexts, yet they connect to other
like groups through the linkages provided by the networked organization and through the horizontal
exchanges. Member groups are shaped by, and shape, the political, economic and material
particularities of the city in which they are based; they are also able to scale up their agency through
interaction with other groups, and in turn be influenced by this learning. This is very different from
the concept of the network as structure and the nodes as agents, although there is no doubt that
decisions are taken by the NGO leadership (on funding, projects, alliances) which set conditions for
the membership — to which they might respond, or resist.

Co-production and planning
Might these new co-production ideas provide inspiration for planning theory and practice, to think
how planning might need to operate differently in a changing world, to unsettle assumptions on
which current theories of engagement are based, and to expand the scope of debates in planning-
related state–society engagements to be more appropriately international? Or to expand the scope
of this argument, might these new ideas contribute to the exploration initiated by Fung and Wright
(2003) for mechanisms of “empowered participatory governance”? Albrechts (2013) has argued that the challenges currently facing cities cannot be tackled
adequately by traditional spatial planning and that co-production may be a useful frame for
developing a more radical approach to strategic spatial planning. This strategic planning would still
be “public sector-led” but through a co-productive process, which could be initiated by non-state
actors, but would require “a fundamental shift in the balance of power” (Albrechts, 2013, p. 9). This
raises the question as to why governments would accept such a shift, unless there is recognition by
the state that it cannot deliver local shelter and services appropriately or unless sufficient civic
pressure is brought to bear. However, the possibility that city-wide strategic spatial planning could be initiated, researched, developed and implemented by local poor communities, in co-production mode with governments, will be far more difficult given the range of powerful stakeholders at the city scale, with the property development industry being a very important player here. Interestingly, one perspective on participatory budgeting processes in Brazil (Albert, 2010) is that they were only possible because of significant delegations of power and resources from the national level. Instituting a power shift from the bottom up may happen occasionally (prior to elections or on initiative from particular councillors or local officials) but is unlikely to be sustained without wider political change, especially in global South contexts where governments are often weak and autocratic. The ACHR has embarked on a process of city-wide slum upgrading (Archer et al., 2012) in bottom-up co-production with governments, but the enumeration, mapping and planning deals with local communities and not the city as a whole. As ACHR develops their strategies at the city-wide scale, and as SDI increasingly seeks to exert pressure on national governments through global advocacy agencies such as Cities Alliance, it will be interesting to track how power operates in co-produced city-wide planning processes.

With regard to the role of individual planning professionals in co-production processes, planners are already involved in NGO-affiliated community organizations, working for communities, and according to SDI and ACHR practices (Archer et al., 2012), with their role being one of support and mutual learning rather than that of the all-knowing expert. Within government, Bovaird (2007, p. 858) has called for a new type of public service professional: the coproduction development officer, who can help to overcome the reluctance of many professionals to share power with users and their communities and who can act internally in organizations (and partnerships) to broker new roles for coproduction between traditional service professionals, service managers, and the political decision makers who shape the strategic direction of the service system.

In many parts of the world these would represent highly progressive (even radical) steps for planning systems and state-based planning professionals.

Certainly, social movement-initiated co-production very differently challenges planners and planning systems. In the SDI examples, planning processes are initiated by communities and their NGOs who take control of all steps in the “value chain”, and decide at what points a co-productive relationship with the state would be appropriated, and the terms on which this would take place. There are now many documented cases in which communities have been able to do this,2 where the outcome has been community building and learning, and where the nature of the planned environments and services has been far more appropriate and affordable than might otherwise have been the case. The slogan: “the poor know best how to live in poverty” is relevant here. These co-production initiatives may not be challenging the economic system which produces their poverty, but they are challenging the distribution of political power which supports their marginalization, at least at the local level.

In co-production processes initiated by social movements, the nature of state–society engagement is significantly different from either the standard and limited approaches to participation adopted by many governments world-wide, or the far more open and democratic approaches introduced through collaborative and communicative planning ideas. The far more radical nature of co-production initiated by social movements, relative to earlier and state-initiated ideas of co-production, needs to be recognized. At the same time, the community-based processes which form the basis of co-production cannot be romanticized, as both Robins and Roy have indicated above. The exercise of power, to either positive or negative ends, will always be present, and the possibility of manipulation and corruption is always possible (even likely) in co-production and in any other form of engagement. Clearly the nature and form of these dynamics will vary regionally across the globe. The assumptions which have tended to underpin collaborative and communicative
planning ideas, particularly regarding the management of power dynamics and the strength, reliability and form of civil society, are all brought into question through understanding cases of co-production and their strengths and failings.

What social movement initiated co-production does offer to the planning field is two-fold. The first is the possibility of extending the range of ideas of alternative forms of state–society engagement beyond what has been on offer so far (recognizing that innovative forms such as participatory budgeting have already served to do this). Planning theory has consistently been fed with ideas from practice, and researched and documented cases of co-production add to the range and scope of these. Co-production strategies such as learning exchanges, festivals and exhibitions, self-enumeration and mapping, and global networking can all serve to strengthen civic action and might be available for appropriation into other contexts. Secondly, given that many co-production cases are taking place in global South contexts, drawing on these experiences helps to understand state–society engagement in a far wider range of regional settings than has normally been the case in planning theory. It is of course critical that co-production experiences are fully understood within their political, social and cultural contexts, and that inappropriate generalization is avoided.

Newer forms of co-production also serve to extend the range of institutional possibilities for “empowered participatory governance” offered by Fung and Wright (2003) 10 years ago. Of their three principles of such governance, the first, practical orientation and addressing immediate needs, is centrally important for co-production. Their second principle, “bottom-up participation” of ordinary citizens rather than a reliance on external experts, also fits well with co-production principles. Their third principle, “deliberative solution generation” which involves participants listening to each other and generating group choices, is the arena in which new co-production processes have largely found important but not sufficient and often difficult to achieve situations of deep conflict. Hence the extension of community solution generating processes to activities such as learning exchanges, festivals, wider scale networking, and when necessary, to protest and civil disobedience. Significantly, however, it is this third principle which has generally been seen as both necessary and sufficient in collaborative and communicative planning approaches, highlighting again the differences between these ideas and co-production.

Conclusion
This paper suggests that new planning theory-building work can productively draw on the concepts and practices of co-production, particularly in its more radical and “bottom-up” forms. But the idea of developing planning thought “from the South” needs to be wary of setting up artificial binaries between global North and global South thinking, or of suggesting a “southern planning theory” as a set of homogenous ideas which again universalize inappropriately from one part of the world to another. Planning theory certainly needs to be able to speak beyond the single case but most importantly needs to recognize the limits of such theorizing and where it might not apply. Healey’s (2012) suggestion of an “origin narrative”, explaining the context of any ideas and the preconditions for their operation, is a useful one, and can help to build an appropriately international body of planning theory which avoids the “best practice” problem and decontextualized theory which ignores the fundamental importance of place in shaping any planning thought and action.

A view “from the South” has further important implications beyond the specificity of place, and that is to understand any place within a global context shaped inevitably by usually asymmetrical relations between metropole and periphery. Global relations of power continue to shape not only the nature of urban development processes and forces of marginalization that accompany them, but also the nature and possibilities of co-production processes that occur as well as the wider acceptability of ideas that emerge from these cases. Research on co-production cases from Kampala, Delhi or Bangkok may not easily be recognized as important contributions to mainstream
planning or urban theory unless there is a generally acknowledged need to develop theory with a
global view in mind. Seeing from the South may certainly destabilize theory of Northern origins,
but ultimately it can only enrich it.

Notes
1. www.achr.net
2. See special issue of Environment and Urbanization (April, 2012) which has articles on a number of cases of
cooproduction in Africa and Asia, previous issues of this journal, the SDI website, and the ACHR website:
http://www.achr.net/achrdownloads.htm

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